Intersections
Volume 2007 | Number 25

Article 7

2007

Sojourners in a Pluralistic Land: The Promise and
Peril of Christian Higher Education
Randall Balmer

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.augustana.edu/intersections
Augustana Digital Commons Citation
Balmer, Randall (2007) "Sojourners in a Pluralistic Land: The Promise and Peril of Christian Higher Education," Intersections: Vol.
2007: No. 25, Article 7.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.augustana.edu/intersections/vol2007/iss25/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Augustana Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intersections by an
authorized administrator of Augustana Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@augustana.edu.

Religious Diversity

RANDALL BALMER

Sojourners in a Pluralistic Land: The Promise and
Peril of Christian Higher Education
I AM CERTAIN to make some enemies here before the evening
is over, so I might as well get started. Despite my respect for
church-related schools, including Lutheran schools, the schools
of the Christian Reformed Church, and even the parochial
school system mandated by the Third Plenary Council of 1884,
and despite my strong conviction that parents have every right to
educate their children anywhere they please (including at home),
I am—and I have been for nearly half a century—a passionate
advocate for public education at the elementary, junior high, and
high school level. Public schools, originally known as “common
schools” in the nineteenth century, may be the only place in our
society where children from various racial, ethnic, and religious
backgrounds can come together and, in the context of both
the classroom and the playground, learn to get along with one
another in at least a measure of comity. That sounds to me like
a recipe for democracy, and it is one that has served us well for
most of American history.
Although I acknowledge that what I have just described is
an ideal view, and that public education is in real trouble today,
I prefer to view the glass as half full rather than half empty.
We need a place in America where children drawn from different backgrounds can meet on a more-or-less equal footing and
learn the rudiments of democracy. Public schools, for all their
faults, provide that space. I worry very much that sending Jewish
children to Jewish schools, Catholic kids to parochial schools,
evangelical kids to Christian schools (or home schooling), and the
children of affluent parents to elite private schools leads inevitably

to a further Balkanization of American society, which cannot help
but have deleterious effects. I believe that if we, as a society, care
anything about the future of democracy, especially in a pluralistic
context, we cannot afford to give up on public education.
I realize full well the implications of what I am saying for
people of faith. It means, at the very least, that parents and
churches have to bear more of the responsibility for the religious
formation of their children. That’s not a simple task, especially in
the context of a media-saturated, peer-driven society. And I also
recognize the ways in which religious schools—whether they be
Jewish, Lutheran, Catholic, or Christian Reformed—have safeguarded the ethnic identity and particularity of specific populations. That is not a negligible consideration, and I acknowledge
its importance. I first became aware of this when I studied the
religious dynamics in colonial New York City. The Collegiate
School, which is still in operation on the upper west side of

“Parents and churches have to bear more
of the responsibility for the religious
formation of their children.”
Manhattan, was founded by the Dutch Reformed Church
in 1628. Shortly after the English Conquest of 1664, Trinity
Church, a congregation of the Church of England, established
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I conclude as promised, by turning to the question of religious
diversity in colleges and universities. To focus the present discussion, I will set aside several very important questions and issues.
First, I focus here on religious diversity rather than on other
issues of diversity. At my college, for example, the question of
racial diversity is a pressing matter of ongoing concern and attention. From the point of view of Lutheran (or Christian) identity,
it seems to me that the theoretical reasons for valuing and pursuing such diversity are evident; the hard part (for isolated colleges
in the land of Norwegians) is strategy for achieving and preserving it. Religious diversity, on the other hand, is easy to achieve
(maybe too easy), but its theoretical support, or its compatibility
with robust and particular religious identity may be less clear.
Next, in focusing on a religiously diverse faculty, I set aside
for now the religious composition of the student body and of
administrative boards, etc. I hope that the applicability of ideas
expressed so far to wider constituencies will be plain, but to
the extent that it is not—or that different considerations are
relevant—I leave that work for another occasion.
Finally, I want to acknowledge that some schools very clearly
and narrowly define the range of faculty religious diversity which
is compatible with their religious identity and academic mission.
Here I have in mind those schools whose faculty positions are
open only to members of the founding denomination, or to scholars who hold a specified range of theological views. In articulating
a model for a wider range of faculty diversity, I want to be clear in
saying that I don’t intend to imply that more restrictive models
are less consistent or desirable. I myself am a graduate of Wheaton
College, and I consider Wheaton (and Calvin, so as not to appear
entirely self-serving) to be an example of religious and academic
integrity, and of exemplary academic excellence. Others disagree,
of course, (see Kenneth Wagner’s “Faith Statements Do Restrict
Academic Freedom” in Academe, January-February 2006, and
responses in that themed issue) but that too is an argument for
another day. For now, I only want to resist that notion that colleges
and universities must choose between adopting the Wheaton/
Calvin model or abandoning substantive Christian identity.
There are strands of that way of thinking on my own campus—
proponents of the opposing choices all being dubious (at best)
that we can long maintain a strong Lutheran identity and a religiously diverse faculty. I am arguing that there is more than one
model for a strong and thoroughgoing Lutheran or Christian
institutional identity in church-related colleges and universities,
including models with religiously diverse faculties.
I hope that at least some elements of the model I propose
will be evident already. Lutherans and many other brands of
Christians may—because of their religious commitments—be

inclined to academic virtues, and if those commitments inform
the ethos of the school, the institution will encourage good pedagogy, interdisciplinary engagement, and academic freedom. So
it’s great to have plenty of Lutherans (or relevant other brands)
around. But the question of religious diversity is, what about
having others around?
One sort of response to the question goes by the name of “critical mass” theory. The idea is that if you have enough Lutherans
(etc.) around to keep the ethos and identity strong, you can have
some others and the benefits they bring without bringing the
house down. I guess it is obvious that Lutheran identity is going
to require having Lutherans (or suitable substitutes) around, but
I’m a little uneasy about tendencies of some versions of critical
mass theories. To be specific, I’m uneasy because they focus more
on the mass than on the rest of the faculty. The problem is that
faculty with other religious commitments, in some sort of freerider status, may be at best indifferent and at worst threatened by
the mission and identity of the school. In practice, younger colleagues in this situation duck and run when talk about mission
and identity comes up, and others may gather resources and allies
to resist or subvert such talk and its object. I don’t know if that’s
the kind of fun you want to have in promoting or preserving
institutional identity, but it’s not the only option.

“Lutherans’ commitment to search for
truth, to critique all perspectives (even
their own), and to nurture creative imagination is served by the presence and
active engagement of opposing ideas.”
Here I’ll suggest that the resources of the Lutheran tradition
for promoting our highest academic aspirations are of central
importance in conceiving of a vibrant, mission-oriented, and
religiously diverse faculty. First of all, why might those principles
promote a diverse faculty? Because Lutherans’ commitment to
search for truth, to critique all perspectives (even their own),
and to nurture creative imagination is served by the presence
and active engagement of opposing ideas, presented by smart
and articulate people who themselves are committed to the
mission. Fine, but how can others be committed to the mission
if, for example, they are not Lutheran or Christian? Well, they
have their own reasons for being committed to the academic
and pedagogical virtues (if they don’t have reasons or don’t have
those commitments would you hire them even if you didn’t care
about religious identity?). Chances are, nobody told them in grad
23

The necessity to acknowledge uncertainty, however, should
not be considered an external restraint on the Christian religious
tradition as personally or institutionally expressed. The notion of
human weakness—including epistemic weakness—is as central
to Christianity as any idea. Allow me to return to Richard
Hughes for an eloquent expression of this academic implication
of the doctrine of human finitude:
This position means that every scholar must always confess
that he or she could be wrong. Apart from this confession,
there can be no serious life of the mind, for only when we
confess that we might be wrong can we engage in the kind
of conversation that takes seriously other voices. And only
when we confess that we might be wrong are we empowered to assess in critical ways our own theories, our own
judgments, and our own understandings (86-7).
It is especially pertinent for the present discussion that Hughes
cites this doctrine and its implications as a particular contribution
of the Lutheran tradition to the life of the mind. Since the possibility of being mistaken is an important motive to free inquiry
in the pursuit of truth, such inquiry ought to be a hallmark of the
Lutheran tradition, and to its institutions of learning.
Thus the Christian tradition, and by extension associated
learning institutions, have internal reasons for allowing free
discussion and questioning—even of their own basic truthclaims. But this is not the only motive for actively encouraging
open inquiry. It is not merely to the extent that one might be
mistaken that one ought to welcome questioning, but also
to the extent that one is confident of the truth of one’s commitments. This point also reiterates Mill, who held that the
highest intellectual ideal is not just to hold true beliefs, but to
hold them in a certain way. His summary of the argument in
On Liberty is this:
Even if the received opinion be...the whole truth; unless it
be suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly
contested, it will...be held in the manner of a prejudice, with
little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And
not only this, but...the meaning of the doctrine itself will
be lost or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the
character and conduct (50).
Free inquiry serves the truth, then, regardless of the status of the
received opinion or tradition. Truth is served by the questioning
of false received opinion for obvious reasons. Truth is served by
free questioning of partially correct received opinion because
the true is thereby winnowed from the false. And, finally, even
22 | Intersections | Spring 2007

wholly true opinions benefit from rigorous questioning since the
vitality of our understanding and use of the truth is enhanced.
The familiar argument for absolute freedom of inquiry and
expression in the second chapter of On Liberty seems to be an
elaboration of the claims implicit in the AAUP’s Statement
on academic freedom, since Mill’s argument depends crucially
upon truth-seeking. To the extent, therefore, that Christian
religious commitment is genuinely characterized by truth-seeking, it is wholly congenial to promoting rigorous free discussion
and inquiry, both as advocated by a key founder of the modern
liberal tradition, and as defended by the primary American academic organization for promoting and protecting free inquiry.
If Christian scholars or Christian institutions are perceived as
being at odds with that tradition or the goals of that organization, they should respond by vigorously emphasizing—in profession and in practice—the common commitment to truth.

“The possibility of being mistaken is an
important motive to free inquiry.”
Here I would like to acknowledge again that not all institutions
with strong Christian commitment put this theory into practice
(hence the preceding exhortation). But I would also like to say that
this theoretical account is more than an apologetic exercise—a
way of reconciling Christian commitment and academic freedom.
To a greater degree than some may realize, the philosophical
foundations for the AAUP’s paradigmatic defense of academic
freedom have been challenged, and in some circles abandoned.
Commitment to those academic standards may depend far more
upon social convention in the academy than upon theoretical
foundations. People defend academic freedom because that’s just
the way we do things. Philosopher Richard Rorty has argued that
this reliance upon convention is sufficient support for academic
freedom. I disagree. I’m not sure that convention and tradition is a
strong enough foundation, and unlike Rorty I think that theoretical justification is possible. This is part—an instance really—of a
larger debate in contemporary political theory about the viability
of classical liberalism (Mill being a key figure in this tradition).
The details of that argument are better left for another occasion.
I will observe, however, that if Christian commitment can be a
theoretical foundation for principles of academic freedom, and if
those principles do turn out to be in need of theoretical support,
then the considerations above may show again that our institutions can exhibit their academic integrity because of—not merely
in spite of—religious identity.

Trinity School. The fortunes of the Collegiate School suffered
thereafter so that by the middle of the eighteenth century, the
Dutch congregation appealed to the ecclesiastical authorities in
the Netherlands for an English-speaking minister; the younger
generation, educated at Trinity School, could no longer understand the Dutch language.
Such is the power of education in transmitting both faith and
culture. I acknowledge that, and I honor its importance. Still,
despite these considerations, I stand by my defense of public
education, while, at the same time, I support the prerogative of
parents to educate their children in any venue they see fit.
Having said that, and although it may sound counterintuitive, I am equally committed to the importance of Christian
higher education. Some of this, I realize, is autobiographical. I
grew up in parsonages in rural Minnesota, Michigan, and Iowa,
where I attended public schools—and I happen to think that
I am none the worse for wear. For college, however, I went to a
Christian liberal arts college and had there (on balance) a wonderful experience, and it is on that experience that I should like
to focus the balance of my remarks this evening.
A few more autobiographical details—of necessity, I’m afraid.
I very nearly didn’t attend college at all; I had started a small
business as a teenager, and I was convinced at the time that this
was what I wanted to pursue as a career. My father, however,
urged me to think about higher education. Finally I agreed, first,
to attend a state university within commuting distance so that I
could continue operating my business. Then, succumbing to a bit
more pressure, I relented and submitted a last-minute application to Trinity College in the North Shore suburbs of Chicago.
The decision to attend college was, I see now, the first of many
Robert Frost moments in my life, where I stood at the fork in the
yellow woods and contemplated two pathways, both of which
seemed agreeable at the time. I have occasionally reflected on
“The Road Not Taken,” and I imagine that, all things considered, I probably chose the better route. And what if I had
chosen the state university? All of this is speculation, of course,
but I suspect that, given my rootedness in evangelicalism, I
would have burrowed deeper into the subculture, this vast and
interlocking network of congregations, denominations, Bible
camps, Bible institutes, mission societies, and publishing houses
that was constructed in earnest during the middle decades of the
twentieth century to protect innocents like me from the depredations of the larger world, a world that my parents believed was
both corrupt and corrupting.
There is safety within the evangelical subculture, I’ll not deny
it—or any religious subculture, for that matter. My religious
upbringing—in the home, at church and youth group and
Sunday school, at vacation Bible school, and Bible camp—had

provided me with a firm grounding in the faith, and I might
very comfortably have remained safely within the bosom of
the subculture.
Instead, I attended a Christian liberal arts college, one supported by my own denomination. Like many such institutions,
it began as a Bible institute, but it evolved, as these schools often
do, into an accredited four-year college. (It now bears the rather
grand moniker of Trinity International University—having
passed, apparently, on Trinity Intergalactic University!)
Soon after I shambled onto campus in early September
1972, I recognized that Trinity was an unusual place, at least
by the standards of Christian higher education. A wise and
forward-looking dean had hired a cohort of young, energetic,
newly-minted PhDs who challenged the presuppositions of their
students, most of whom hailed from politically and theologically
conservative households. But they did so not as provocateurs but
as fellow-travelers, and they did so not with the intention of robbing us of our faith altogether. As a student, as someone whose
notion of rebellion was to wear blue jeans to the Sunday-evening
service, the experience of probing the parameters of the faith and
questioning the shibboleths of the subculture was unsettling.
But it was also bracing, and it changed me in ways that even
now, in late middle age, I appreciate only in part.
Beginning with the publication of the first edition of
Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangelical
Subculture in America (1989), I’ve heard from dozens of people
over the years who were reared evangelical but who left the faith,
many of them in late adolescence. Their letters are poignant,
even plaintive. They reminisce, page after single-spaced page,
about their religious background—Sunday school and singing songs around the campfire. They express appreciation for
their upbringing and sadness for having left the faith. Some left
because of intellectual doubts or because of sexual orientation
or because of what they perceived as hypocrisy in the ranks of
the religious leadership. More recently, I hear utter disgust at the
ways in which the leaders of the Religious Right have delivered
the faith captive to right-wing politics.
Finally, these correspondents express a kind of envy of someone who has been able to retain his faith. For some, those who
perceive me as an intellectual, the fact that I teach at a prestigious university deepens the conundrum because they assume, I
guess, that no one with academic credentials can simultaneously
be an advocate for the faith.
I respond carefully to these letters, and I acknowledge that
even a college sophomore can explain faith away as hysteria
or delusion or the search for a father figure. Then I generally explain my decision years ago that I would not allow the
canons of Enlightenment rationalism be the final arbiter of
15

truth. I elect to inhabit an enchanted universe where there are
forces at work beyond my understanding or control. I wouldn’t
live anywhere else.
I don’t know whether or not my testimony is compelling, but
I’ve come to reflect on why it is that I’ve been able to retain the
faith when so many of my contemporaries have lost or discarded
theirs. I suspect that, as with all such matters, a variety of factors come into play, but I have to believe that my formation at a
Christian liberal arts college was crucial. Trinity College was far
from perfect, but I think the place struck the right balance in a
number of ways.
First, I think that any such institution faces the challenge of
navigating between the Scylla of secularism and the Charybdis
of sectarianism—although I think that channel is wider than is
commonly believed. I heard a lot of rhetoric about “the integration of faith and learning” when I was an undergraduate—a lot
of rhetoric. It was an effective mantra, a comforting piety, but I
was never exactly sure what it meant, nor do I know today.
The dangers inherent in such pieties are obvious, and they
have been amply illustrated in recent years in the calls for a kind
of repristinization of America’s educational institutions. Yale is
no longer a safe haven for Congregationalists, the lament goes, or
Princeton for Presbyterians. No one will argue that many of the
nation’s élite institutions of higher education are still the “nurseries of piety” that their founders intended. But the accompanying
argument that people of faith should be granted special pleading
in the academy is, to say the least, suspect. I will never contend
that the academy is a perfect meritocrary—I have my own quiver
of anecdotes and more than a few bruises to refute that—but
people of faith need to play by the same rules and abide by the
same standards of academic scholarship as everyone else.
For example, as a person of faith and as a historian of religion
in America, I believe that the hand of God was present in the
event historians call the Great Awakening, a revival of piety that
swept along the Atlantic seaboard in the 1730s and 1740s. When
I teach the Great Awakening, however, or when I write about
the topic, I describe the historical, social, and cultural circumstances that gave rise to the Great Awakening, and I quote the
perceptions of contemporaries that it was an event of supernatural inspiration. But for me to attribute the revival solely to
divine providence would be to default on my responsibilities as
a historian.
Or, to take another recent example, consider the case for
intelligent design, a topic I cover extensively in Thy Kingdom
Come. For that chapter, I framed the issue by describing a
debate at Princeton University between Lee Silver, a molecular
biologist at Princeton, and William Dembski, a kind of high
priest of intelligent design and the chief evangelist for the intel16 | Intersections | Spring 2007

ligent design movement. I made it clear in my narrative that,
as a person of faith, I happen to believe in intelligent design
(or something very close to it), although I confess that I’ve
grown accustomed over the years to referring to the “intelligent
designer” simply as “God.” I rehearsed Dembski’s very impressive academic credentials and suggested that, although I laid no
claims to being a theologian or a philosopher, he struck me as a
very competent theologian and philosopher. But the issue is the
validity of Dembski’s assertion that intelligent design is science
and therefore should be taught in the science classroom.
If he means to be a scientist, Dembski should be prepared to
make his case as a scientist and not angle for special pleading,
as he did in the debate at Princeton. He argued, in effect, that
because he is a person of faith he should therefore be exempted
from the mores of inquiry peculiar to the discipline he claims
as his own. As I emphasized in the chapter, I have no objections whatsoever to the teaching of intelligent design in colleges or universities; in fact, one of my PhD students, with my
blessing, taught a course in intelligent design at Columbia this
past summer. But the appropriate venue for such inquiry is the
religion classroom or the philosophy seminar—at least until
Dembski or someone can make a case that intelligent design is
science. (Even the judge in the Dover, Pennsylvania, intelligent
design case, a George W. Bush appointee, found this claim
ludicrous. By peddling their theological claims as science,
Dembski and the intelligent design advocates seek a double
standard: “Hey look, I’m a scientist! I don’t do any of the
things that other scientists do, I refuse to submit my work for
peer review, I don’t ask the same questions that other scientists
ask, and I don’t want to play by the rules of scientific inquiry,
but, trust me, I’m a scientist!”
That, I submit, is no way to integrate faith and learning. It
fails to abide by the professional standards of the academy, and,
more important, it demeans the faith because it suggests that
faith needs the imprimatur of science in order to be valid. I
emphatically reject that notion.
If that sort of intellectual dishonesty represents the
Charybdis of sectarianism, the Scylla of secularism at institutions of Christian higher education is a kind of intellectual
arrogance that is allergic to expressions of piety. I understand
this aversion, especially because I grew up within evangelicalism,
where piety tends too often toward the rote and formulaic. I too
participated in this cult of intellectualism, especially in graduate
school—a reaction, no doubt, to my upbringing.
Engendering spirituality and encouraging piety is a tricky
business, and I’ve never trusted institutions with this task.
Institutions, in fact, are remarkably poor vessels of piety, in my
experience; they tend to quash it more often than abet it, so

Note that, if the religious commitment of the institution is
just lip-service, if the core questions are seen as imposed on some
by others, or if those questions are widely considered irrelevant
to subjects of substantive academic inquiry, then this particular
academic benefit is very unlikely to result. It seems in this case,
then, that the more substantive the religious commitment, the
greater the academic benefit. Substantive religious commitment in
an institution means, in part, a faculty and administration which
take the core questions of the tradition seriously. Note also that
respect for these questions and attention to them do not imply an
imposed consensus about their answers. In fact, the goal of integrating a course of academic study around key common questions
would seem to be served by the broadest possible range of perspectives on the questions. This is a key consideration in the matter of
religious diversity, to which I will return below. Before ending the
discussion of religious identity and academic integrity, however,
the crucial issue of academic freedom must be addressed.

Academic Integrity: Free Inquiry
I won’t beat around the bush about this. One of the reasons why
we have to talk about academic freedom in this context (and one
of the reasons why apprehension about religion and the academy may be well-founded) is a very real history of abuse of this
principle by religiously-affiliated colleges and universities—in
the name of their religious identity. It is by no means the case
that only religious institutions, or that all religious institutions,
have violated this principle. Nor is it true, in my view, that
every religious restriction is an unjustified or abusive violation
of academic freedom. It is nevertheless the case that religiouslybased violations of academic freedom too often occur. Some
think that, for this reason alone, religious commitment must
be considered a threat to the academic integrity of educational
institutions. I don’t think that’s true, and I’ll say why in terms of
(at least one version of) Christian commitment.
The preeminent banner under which academic freedom is
promoted in the United States is the American Association of
University Professors’ 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure. Justification for policies urged in the document is offered, in part, as follows:
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the
common good and not to further the interest of either
the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The
common good depends upon the free search for truth and
its free exposition.

Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and
applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in research
is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic
freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the
protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of
the student to freedom in learning.
The 1940 Statement advocates academic freedom on grounds
that the principle is crucial to the search for truth. I want to
make it clear that this line of justification for free inquiry does
not put it at odds with Christian commitment. Insofar as
principles of free inquiry aid the pursuit of truth, scholars and
institutions committed to the Christian tradition should be vigorous advocates for academic freedom—given the importance of
truth-seeking to that tradition.
For the sake of brevity, I will not make even a cursory attempt
to survey or explain the role of truth-seeking in the Christian
tradition. Allow me simply to represent this long-standing (even if
recently underemphasized) aspect of the tradition with Cardinal
Newman’s claim from The Idea of A University that “Truth...is the
main object of Religion.” (Discourse II.5) This will suffice because
the phrase not only represents Christian truth-seeking but is also
likely to incite just the sort of suspicion that we are undertaking to
address. Why is it that academically-inclined people get nervous
when Christians start talking about truth?
One reason (and here we might go all the way back to the
notorious—even if abused—example of Galileo) is that authoritative professions to have the truth can be taken as grounds to
stop looking for it, or asking questions, or listening to others.
Since this attitude has too commonly accompanied strong
religious commitment (both in- and outside the academy) it has
undoubtedly encouraged widespread resistance to the notion of
truth being “the main object of religion,” and a corresponding
lack of appreciation for Christianity’s conceptual capacity to
undergird principles and policies of academic freedom.
Nevertheless, an attitude which impedes the search for truth
because truth has already been found fails to take sufficient
account of uncertainty. Mill makes this point in his classic
argument for free expression: “All silencing of discussion,” he
writes in On Liberty, “is an assumption of infallibility” (17). To
shut off questioning or the airing of alternative views on grounds
that the truth is known is—given the assumption that the truth
is important—implicitly to claim certainty. (Mill points out
that even the practical considerations which may require an end
of discussion are served by prior open inquiry.) Certainty is, of
course, a vanishingly rare commodity if taken to refer to the
impossibility of being mistaken rather than to mere strength of
conviction, and thus the consideration is a compelling one.
21

Others have articulated this more elegantly and in more
detail than I can pretend here, and I’ll refer to just a couple of
familiar examples. Almost fifteen years ago, Mark Schwehn
described how spiritual virtues are indispensable to academic
inquiry and emphasized the role of Christian communities of
learning in Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation
in America. More recently, Richard Hughes has elaborated how
Christian faith can sustain the life of the mind in his book of
that title. Hughes claims that “a scholar’s Christian faith can
express itself in the highest and finest kind of scholarship—a
scholarship committed to search for truth, to engage a variety
of conversation partners, to critique all perspectives, even one’s
own, and to nurture creative imagination” (11). When (appropriately for our present discussion) he focuses on the Lutheran
tradition as a whole, Hughes has this to say:
The truth is, the Lutheran tradition possesses some of the
most potent theological resources for sustaining the life
of the mind that one can imagine. It encourages dialogue
between the Christian faith and the world of ideas, fosters
intellectual humility, engenders a healthy suspicion of
absolutes, and helps create a conversation in which all
partners are taken seriously (93).
On the subject of teaching and pedagogy, I need only mention
the familiar work of Parker Palmer. Though much of this work is
not explicitly Christian or religious, I agree with both Schwehn
and Hughes that all of it is deeply and substantively rooted in
Palmer’s Quaker heritage. A more explicit illustration from a
colleague at a Lutheran college is Lendol Calder’s “For Teachers
to Live, Professors Must Die” presented at Baylor University’s
Christianity and the Soul of the University conference in 2004.
Calder powerfully applies to classrooms the claim from the
Gospel of John that “unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground
and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies it bears much fruit.”
But it isn’t the case that just telling people how to live
Christianity (or religion) tells people how to teach. The very
act of asking what religion has to do with what goes on in our
schools can move us to analysis of our pedagogical aspirations
and methods. The most substantive and illuminating public
discussion of teaching I have ever been in at Luther College was
just a month or so ago, and it wasn’t in a workshop on pedagogy.
It occurred among a group of second-year faculty from a wide
range of disciplines and religious perspectives, convened for a
workshop on the mission of the college and on what we tend to
call “the dialogue between faith and learning.” Talking about
the interactions of persons with widely varying fundamental
commitments in our institution led us directly—and repeat20 | Intersections | Spring 2007

edly—to the central questions of what we seek to accomplish
in our classrooms, and what means and methods will make it
happen. This is a specific way in which our institutional commitment to questions of religious identity invigorates and enhances
our academic work and aspirations.

“Institutional commitment to questions
of religious identity invigorates and
enhances our academic work and
aspirations.”
The example of Luther College’s faith and learning discussions (with the reader’s indulgence) will also serve to introduce
one way in which religious identity can enhance what I’ve
labeled institutional or curricular virtues. In the course of our
wide-ranging discussion about the meaning and implications
of the Lutheran academic tradition, contributions by workshop
members were often prefaced by phrases like “As a biologist
I...” or “In Social Work we...” or “historians sometimes...” The
idea here is that the nature of the conversation not only elicited
varying disciplinary perspectives on a common idea, but also
required the articulation of what that disciplinary perspective
consists of and how, to some extent, it works internally. The
fact that such articulation is necessary even among faculty and
that opportunity for conversation that requires it is increasingly rare reflects increasing fragmentation along disciplinary
lines in higher education. In their Devil’s Dictionary for Higher
Education, Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt have labeled the
extremes of this trend as “entrepreneurial disciplinarity,” a circumstance which despairs of identifying any common mission
even within disciplines. Of the many ways in which liberal arts
colleges might emulate the habits of faculty-producing research
universities, surely this is one of the more pernicious.
The discussion in our faculty workshop on faith and learning
illustrates a more general principle. Institutional religious commitment or identity serves the academic goals of learning communities
by inviting—or provoking—conversation across disciplines, and
providing a framework for integrating disciplinary pursuits and
perspectives. Insofar as the core claims of the institution’s religious
tradition cut across disciplinary lines, and insofar as those claims
are taken seriously, they provide a set of questions serving as integration or contact points for the various elements of an academic
course of study. (These core claims or questions serve this academic
function for all members of the academic community—whether
individually within the affiliated religious tradition or not.)

the programmatic approach of chapels, chaplains, and spiritual
emphasis weeks—commendable and important though they
may be—falls short, in my judgment.
I turn instead to the incarnational expressions of faith and
piety. What I found most effective during my intellectual and
spiritual development in college was the example of my mentors.
These were women and men of deep and abiding faith who were
also manifestly human. They were unafraid to question their
faith or to express their doubts, but the best of them also modeled for me a piety that found expression not only in declarations of belief but in sincere intellectual engagement and lives of
integrity. They were my teachers in the fullest sense of the word.
Their example impressed me deeply and affected me profoundly,
and I maintain my friendships with many of these mentors to
this day, thirty years after graduation.
Aside from the twin perils of secularity, which manifests
itself in intellectualism, and sectarianism, which posits a kind of
alternate academic universe, the final peril of Christian higher
education is insularity. Shirley Nelson’s troubling novel, The Last
Year of the War, a thinly fictionalized account of student life at
Moody Bible Institute, illustrates this copiously, and although
I’m certainly aware of the differences between Bible schools and
Christian liberal arts colleges, I think Nelson’s novel is certainly
worth reading. I recall that I seldom read a newspaper while I was
in college, and I had little interaction with the larger world during
the academic year, aside from my jobs in the community. Add to
that the homogeneity that tends very often to afflict these schools,
and the problem of insularity becomes acute.

“The final peril of Christian higher
education is insularity.”
I ran across an extreme example of this during my visit
to Patrick Henry College last December. Patrick Henry was
founded in 2000 by Michael Farris to provide a place where
parents who home-schooled their children could secure a college education free from such alien influences as feminism or
Darwinism, a place where, in effect, parents could rest assured
that their children would never encounter an idea that the
parents would find objectionable or even questionable. The
school’s website (www.phc.edu), for example, informs parents
that all “biology, Bible or other courses at PHC dealing with
creation will teach creation from the understanding of Scripture
that God’s creative work, as described in Genesis 1:1-31, was
completed in six twenty-four hour days.” Students who attend

Patrick Henry College, moreover, pledge to “reserve sexual activity for the sanctity of marriage” and promise to “seek and obtain
parental permission when pursuing a romantic relationship.”
Patrick Henry, as I said, is an extreme example of insularity,
but the unfortunate corollary is that Patrick Henry College
also aspires to train America’s leaders for the twenty-first
century. Michael Farris, the founder and now the chancellor
of the school, told the New York Times that the sentiment he
hears most often from parents is that I want my kid to be on the
Supreme Court someday. Farris added that, if we get enough
kids into the “farm system,” that will happen. Since 2002,
Patrick Henry College, a school with an enrollment of only
two hundred, has placed twenty-four of its students as White
House interns; a larger number have served internships in other
governmental agencies and on the Congressional staffs of elected
officials sympathetic to the Religious Right.
These are the people who aspire to lead the United States,
this gorgeously pluralistic nation, in the twenty-first century.
Because of their home-schooling and their experience at Patrick
Henry College, these students most likely have never had any
sustained or significant interaction with anyone outside of their
own cohort of white, middle-class evangelicals. Because of the
insular nature of their upbringing and their undergraduate
education, they have never encountered an idea or an argument—feminism, for instance, or civil rights for lesbians and
gays or Darwinism or environmentalism—except in caricature.
As I ask in Thy Kingdom Come, I wonder how many graduates
of Patrick Henry College have ever read Das Kapital or The
Feminine Mystique or Fast Food Nation or Catcher in the Rye
or The Autobiography of Malcolm X. How many of them have
watched the “Eyes on the Prize” documentary or “The Future of
Food” or “What Happened to the Electric Car?” What goes on
at Patrick Henry is not so much education as indoctrination.
I emphasize (a second time) that Patrick Henry College is an
extreme example of insularity, but it points to a real danger faced
by institutions of Christian higher education. Instead of a hot
house, I prefer to think of Christian liberal arts colleges as halfway
houses, a place where students reared in a religious subculture can
begin to interact with the wider world. They experiment with
new ideas and try on new personas (which, of course, is the task
of every adolescent). They interact with the larger culture not by
plunging directly into the sea of pluralism and secularity, but by
means of tentative forays—dipping a toe in the water, teasing the
waves, and then maybe a few dog paddles into the current, but
never far from a mentor navigating the same waters.
This is my vision for Christian higher education, a venue
where students thoroughly grounded in the religion of their
parents can begin to interact with the world outside of their own
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subculture—not from a posture of fear or defensiveness, though
some of that is inevitable, but from a position of strength and
curiosity and engagement. Are there risks inherent in such a
strategy? Of course there are, and we all have stories of those
who have lost their faith in the process. But my experience, not
to mention my theology, tells me that we have to trust the process and, more important, trust that Jesus will ultimately gather
his children unto himself.

“This is my vision for Christian higher
education…”
If I am right that Christian liberal arts colleges represent a
good place to make an effective transition from the subculture
to the larger world, one key component for that transition is
exposure to pluralism and the avoidance of insularity. How to
do that? Admissions officers, in my experience, make a goodfaith effort to recruit students beyond the usual cohort, but the
competition for qualified students of color is often fierce. But
there are other ways to combat insularity and to expose students
to the universe beyond their subculture.
In a perfect world, one with unlimited resources, I’d start
by providing every student with a daily subscription to the
New York Times—not because the New York Times is perfect
or inerrant, but because it opens a window to the larger world
and it instills the importance of becoming conversant with
developments beyond the campus. I’d encourage faculty to
expose students to ideas other than those sanctioned by the
religious subculture—and to do so with primary sources
rather than through the lens of secondary treatments.
Internships are also effective (Patrick Henry College is right
about that), but let’s encourage students to think creatively
about their activities outside of campus. Non-profit (and
non-religious) agencies, environmental networks, political
campaigns, local government, hospice, councils of churches,
interfaith agencies—all of these expose students to people and
ideas beyond their own subculture.

And it’s time also to think more creatively about the meaning of pluralism. Not only African Americans, for example, but
Hispanic Americans and Native Americans and South Asians
and people of different ethnic backgrounds. Diversity comes
in many colors, creeds, and ages. I would love to see Christian
liberal arts colleges construct condominiums and townhouses
for retirees on or adjacent to their campuses. Invite seniors to
participate fully in campus life, to attend classes and athletic
and cultural events, and interact with students in the dining
halls. And can you imagine the volunteer work force they would
contribute to the campus? One of the real scandals of American
society is the way we warehouse the elderly in nursing homes
and neglect them, rather than draw on their experience and
wisdom. And, who knows, maybe one of the students will one
day point us to a better way of treating our elders.
I have no regrets whatsoever for choosing the path that
led me to a Christian liberal arts college all those years ago.
My undergraduate education shaped me in important ways
by exposing me gradually to a larger world that I never would
have encountered had I remained sequestered in my religious
subculture—or certainly would have encountered on very different terms. I’m grateful for that. I’m grateful for the example
of my mentors, fellow-travelers in the enterprise of sustaining
the faith in an environment that all too frequently is hostile to
faith. The whole experience of baccalaureate studies made my
faith stronger and more resilient, but it also ensured that I could
never again hide my light under a bushel or burrow back into
the insularity of the subculture.
I function today as a person of faith in a pluralistic context. As
such, I simultaneously inhabit two worlds, and I embrace them
both—sometimes with fear and trembling, but more often with
gusto and enthusiasm. I wouldn’t have it any other way.
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STORM BAILEY

Lutheran Identity, Academic Integrity, and
Religious Diversity
I WOULD BE PLEASED to discover that my approach to
the question of “Lutheran Identity and Academic Integrity”
is shaped by an outdated concern. I am concerned about
the assumption that religious commitment in general—and
Christian commitment in particular—threatens purely academic aspirations. If this is no longer the dominant view in
American higher education, that fact is very good news. Even
so, some—perhaps some few—continue to suppose that, when
it comes to religious identity and academic integrity, the only
real question is which one will give way to the other. I want to
say that neither has to give way to the other. In fact, I want to say
more than that. If we are past the point where people say “that
can’t be a good school because it’s religious,” another sentiment
may still be common: “that’s a pretty good school in spite of
being religious.” I propose to emphasize ways in which Lutheran
identity might promote our academic aspirations; that is to say, I
want to suggest the possibility that someone might say “that’s a
pretty good school because it’s religious.”
In suggesting this possibility, I’ll mention three kinds of
considerations: academic virtues, institutional or curricular
virtues, and the matter of academic freedom. In spite of the fact
that religious (or Christian, or Lutheran) colleges and universities have not always exhibited excellence in these areas, not only
can they do so, but they can do so for emphatically religious
(or Christian, or Lutheran) reasons. I will try to make this case
fairly quickly, because even if it is persuasive, questions should
remain about the third aspect of my professed topic (and the

emphasis of this conference): diversity. I will focus on religious
diversity because it may seem most out of line with the argument
so far proposed. After all, if whatever we are up to is a substantively Lutheran mission, doesn’t it stand to reason that we need
Lutherans to pull it off, and that Lutherans are the ones who
will enjoy the fruits of it? I don’t think so. Actually, what I think
is that we don’t need only Lutherans. I will argue in the concluding discussion of religious diversity that the people who can say
“that’s a pretty good school because it’s Lutheran or Christian”
don’t have to be Lutheran or Christian to say it—if it’s true.

Academic Integrity: Academic and Curricular Virtues
Recent critiques of Enlightenment ideals such as individualism,
objectivity and certainty have carried over to academic practices
and institutions which bear the stamp of those ideals, and I should
confess at the outset that I do not side wholeheartedly with critics of the Enlightenment academy. Nevertheless, even if one is
enamored of individualism, the communal nature of learning and
the pursuit of knowledge is undeniable. Further, no matter how
significant the ideals of objectivity and certainty may be, it must
be regarded as folly to ignore the limits of finite (and interested)
reason—bound by perspective even if reality is not. Since this is
the case, the academic enterprise—learning, research, teaching—
requires communities in which the virtues of humility, hospitality
and charity (to name but a few) are deeply ingrained. Christian
communities are not the only ones in which these virtues ought to
flourish, but they should be exemplary ones.
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